Mining Agreements in Africa: Breaking Free from the Past

In 1998, the government of a mineral-rich African nation signed a 30-year agreement with a global mining company. The deal promised jobs, infrastructure, and royalties. Two decades later, communities around the mine still live with poor schools, degraded land, and undrinkable water. The company, meanwhile, has reaped billions.

This is not an isolated story. Across the continent, long-term mining agreements have too often locked governments into rigid terms that limit their ability to adapt, capture fair revenue, or protect communities. These contracts, written in the fine print of “stabilisation clauses”, freeze taxes, royalties, and regulations for decades, insulating corporations from political or market changes.

In a world racing towards energy transition, such agreements are not just outdated; they are dangerous. They risk leaving African governments with little leverage to use mineral wealth to fund renewables, modernise grids, and support a just transition.

The problem with “stabilisation”

At the heart of the issue are stabilisation clauses. They may sound benign, a way to provide investors with certainty. But in practice, they lock governments into unfair arrangements.

Imagine an African state that signs a 25-year mining contract in 2000. By 2015, global commodity prices surge, or new environmental standards become urgent. If the state wants to raise royalties, strengthen safeguards, or introduce new community benefit provisions, the stabilisation clause forbids it. The government must either maintain the outdated terms or face costly arbitration in international courts.

This rigidity denies countries the sovereignty to respond to dynamic realities. Instead of contracts serving as living instruments that evolve with economic and social contexts, they become straitjackets. Meanwhile, multinational firms enjoy guaranteed profits, often backed by international legal systems tilted in their favour. Stabilisation, in effect, becomes fossilisation, freezing governance frameworks in ways that undermine development, climate action, and justice.

Civil society demands change

African civil society groups have long raised the alarm. Organisations from Ghana to Tanzania, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Guinea, have documented how stabilisation clauses and weak contract terms deprive states of billions in potential revenues. Their advocacy has not only exposed the costs of bad deals but also highlighted pathways towards more balanced governance.

The African Mining Vision (AMV), adopted in 2009, embodies many of these demands. It calls for transparent, equitable, and flexible contracts that place Africa’s people at the centre of resource governance. Yet implementation has been slow. Too often, national political elites benefit from opaque deals, while international financiers encourage agreements that prioritise “investor certainty” over development outcomes.

Civil society groups are pushing for stronger negotiation capacity within governments. They argue that specialised mining contract units, staffed with lawyers, economists, and geologists, can level the playing field when negotiating with multinational firms that often deploy teams of international consultants. They also emphasise the need for regional cooperation, to avoid a “race to the bottom” where African countries undercut each other to attract investors with ever-lower royalties and exemptions. Without such reforms, mining will remain a source of conflict and inequality, rather than empowerment.

The opportunity cost: energy transition

The debate over mining agreements cannot be separated from the energy transition. Critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium, manganese, and rare earth elements are essential to the global shift towards renewable energy and electric mobility. Africa holds some of the largest reserves of these resources, positioning the continent as a potential powerhouse in the clean energy economy.

Yet if contracts remain rigid and unbalanced, Africa risks repeating the mistakes of the fossil fuel era: exporting raw materials cheaply while importing manufactured products at high cost. For example, cobalt mined in the DRC may power electric cars in Europe, while Congolese communities still rely on diesel generators. The absence of fair, flexible contracts means governments are unable to capture windfall revenues or demand value-addition commitments.

This is the opportunity cost of bad governance. Every dollar locked away by unfair stabilisation clauses is a dollar that could fund solar mini-grids, modernise transmission networks, or support gender-inclusive energy access. Mining governance, therefore, is energy transition governance. Unless contracts are reformed, Africa will remain a supplier of raw inputs for global decarbonisation while its people continue to live in energy poverty.

Rethinking sovereignty in contracts

There is growing recognition that sovereignty is not only about signing deals but about shaping them to be adaptable, inclusive, and future-proof. Governments must retain the right to adjust fiscal terms, strengthen environmental protections, and demand local content as circumstances evolve. This requires rejecting the notion that stability for investors must mean immobility for governments.

Flexibility does not mean instability. It means designing agreements that acknowledge dynamic realities, fluctuating mineral prices, new international climate targets, and evolving community demands. Countries like Botswana have demonstrated that renegotiation is possible, using revenues from diamonds to build infrastructure and social services. Others, such as Tanzania, have sought to rewrite unfair contracts to restore fiscal balance. These examples prove that sovereignty can be reclaimed if political will aligns with institutional capacity.

For Africa’s future, the question is not whether contracts should evolve, but how they should be designed to ensure adaptability while maintaining investor confidence. Durable mining contracts are those that allow governments to respond to change without undermining development objectives or community rights. That is the kind of sovereignty Africa must insist on in the age of transition.

From competition to cooperation

One of Africa’s greatest weaknesses lies in fragmentation. Too often, neighbouring countries compete against one another to attract investment, offering progressively weaker terms, lower taxes, smaller royalties, diluted safeguards. This “race to the bottom” benefits investors but erodes the collective bargaining power of African states.

Regional cooperation offers a way out. If countries share information, align fiscal frameworks, and negotiate from a common position, they can shift the balance of power. Initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) already point towards new forms of economic coordination. Mining governance could build on this momentum, establishing continental or regional benchmarks that prevent undercutting.

Cross-border solidarity is not only about economics. It is also about justice. Communities in Ghana and Guinea, Zambia and DRC, face similar struggles with displacement, pollution, and exclusion. A coordinated approach ensures that reforms benefit not just individual states but regional populations. It also helps position Africa as a unified actor in global critical mineral supply chains, rather than a patchwork of weak competitors.

A just transition demands just contracts

The global push for a just energy transition cannot succeed if African countries remain locked into exploitative mining deals. Fair, transparent, and flexible contracts are not a luxury, they are a precondition for resilience. They determine whether mineral wealth finances schools and clinics or disappears offshore. They shape whether renewables are built for African communities or exported elsewhere.

Civil society has been clear: resource governance is inseparable from climate justice. Mining revenues must be channelled into powering homes, creating jobs, and building sustainable economies. Contracts are not just legal documents; they are political blueprints for the future. If they continue to privilege profit over people, the transition will fail those who need it most.

The choice is clear. Africa can either cling to contracts written in the language of the past, or it can insist on agreements that secure its future. Mining governance is energy transition governance. Unless contracts are reimagined, Africa risks exporting its future while importing poverty. But if they are rewritten with courage and foresight, they can become instruments of empowerment, justice, and renewal.

“Mining governance is energy transition governance. Without reform, Africa risks exporting its future while importing poverty.”