Communicating Ghana’s Energy Sector Reform: Restoring Public Trust

Every time Ghana's electricity tariffs rise, households and businesses ask the same question: what will we get for paying more? Deborah Bonney's Signature Analysis argues that the country's power sector has struggled to answer it, and that the failure is costing more than goodwill.

Ghana's Energy Sector Recovery Program (ESRP), approved with World Bank support in 2024, was meant to restore the financial health of the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and reduce the sector's burden on public finances. In June 2026, the World Bank rated both its progress and its implementation "Unsatisfactory". ECG's collection efficiency stood at about 85 percent, below the 93 percent target for December 2026, and the combined losses of ECG and its northern counterpart, NEDCo, remained well above target.

Bonney, a regulatory communications specialist and ETA Fellow, reads those numbers as a symptom of a deeper problem. Ghana's energy crisis is financial and technical, she argues, but it is also a crisis of institutional credibility.

The links exist but do not connect

The ESRP is not short of accountability machinery. It has implementation arrangements, results monitoring and reporting. What it lacks, the paper argues, is an integrated process linking financial support, verified performance, escalation and public reporting.

When data are incomplete, delayed or contested, it becomes hard to tell policy failure from failures of execution or reporting. Responsibilities are fragmented across ministries, utilities and regulators. Communication tends to follow decisions rather than shape them. And some contractual arrangements keep fixed payments flowing even when demand, collections or available cash fall short.

The consequences reach the public directly. The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) can exercise its regulatory, monitoring and enforcement powers, but it cannot compel ministries or other institutions to deliver commitments outside its mandate. When tariff adjustments arrive without visible evidence of coordinated improvement, resistance rises and compliance may fall.

The same test for investors and government

Investors judge the sector on the predictability of its cash flows. Low collections, losses, tariff uncertainty, dollar-denominated obligations and arrears all weaken bankability and increase reliance on government guarantees. Bonney's point is that the constraint is not only capital, but the absence of credible revenue protection and transparent management of downside risk.

Take-or-pay power purchase agreements illustrate the stakes. The World Bank estimated that Ghana had about 851 MW of excess thermal capacity at the end of 2022, with costs not fully reflected in tariffs. The paper treats that as historical evidence, not a current estimate, and avoids assigning blame for individual contracts. Its argument is about process: future agreements and any renegotiation should be tested against affordability, system readiness, demand forecasts and disclosure before public guarantees are extended.

It also proposes a ring-fenced revenue mechanism that would protect designated sector revenues while linking access to them to verified performance, with legal authority, fiscal approval, independent verification and safeguards against open-ended public liabilities.

A six-month compact

The paper's central proposal is a six-month, Cabinet-endorsed delivery mandate coordinated by the Ministers for Energy and Finance, working through a small joint secretariat and a shared dashboard. It would produce a public performance compact: a set of commitments, each with a baseline, target, owner, data source, verification method, reporting frequency and deadline, covering collections, losses, reliability, payment discipline and protections for vulnerable households.

The sequence is specific. Month one establishes governance and data responsibilities. Month two verifies the financial and operational baseline. Months three and four resolve data disputes and develop revenue-protection options. Month five consults and drafts the compact. Month six secures approval, publishes commitments and launches public reporting.

Crucially, the compact claims no powers the participating institutions do not already hold. PURC takes part under its statutory mandate, and its tariff-setting and enforcement powers remain independent of ministers.

Communication as part of the reform

Bonney's background shows in the paper's final argument. Communication, she writes, should be built into reform design rather than treated as publicity after decisions are made. Each major measure should explain the problem being addressed, who is responsible, how vulnerable consumers are protected, what results are expected and when.

As Ghana prepares its 2027 budget, the paper offers a test for any energy measure it contains: will the public be able to see whether it worked? The paper's case is that rebuilding that visibility is what makes every later tariff decision, financing deal and investment commitment easier to defend.

The full Signature Analysis, including five figures, the proposed delivery structure and the communications framework, is available to download